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A. The Bondholder Constituency
Since December 20, 1994, the Mexican Peso has fallen dramati-
cally in value. As a result, Mexican companies that incurred a sub-
stantial amount of debt denominated in foreign currencies have
experienced an enormous increase in their liabilities, giving rise to li-
quidity and/or leverage problems. The response of the Mexican gov-
ernment to the inflation sparked by the devaluation-a tight money
policy leading to high real interest rates-has given rise to Mexico's
most severe recession since the 1930s. The recession has led to a
sharp drop in demand among Mexican consumers, and has created
significant business problems for a number of Mexican companies that
target the Mexican market rather than the export market.
The liquidity and leverage problems and, to a lesser extent, the
business problems are common to many of Mexico's largest compa-
nies, a large number of which carry substantial amounts of external
debt. Since 1988, more than sixty Mexican companies have sold to
emerging markets investors dollar-denominated bonds, primarily in
the form of unsecured Eurobonds (including Eurobonds issued under
medium term note programs) that are not registered under U.S. secur-
ities laws. Investors in these debt securities are very diverse, and in-
clude U.S. insurance companies, pension funds, and public mutual
funds, as well as off-shore funds, foreign financial institutions and off-
shore retail investors.' Most of these Eurobond issues have been in
the range of $50 to $200 million,' although a few have been in
amounts of $300 million or more.
3
At the beginning of 1995, outstanding Mexican Eurobonds to-
taled, collectively, approximately $20 billion, of which approximately
$13 billion had been issued by private sector Mexican companies.4 As
the Mexican devaluation crisis commenced, the Mexican corporate
sector also had substantial foreign currency-denominated bank debt
I See generally World Bank, World Bank Debt Tables 1993-94, Part 1.1. External finance for
developing countries; Financial flows to developing countries: developments and issues, pp. 9-
29; Id, Part 11.3. Appendixes - Portfolio investment in developing countries, Mexico, pp. 126-
127, 130, 131. In addition to Eurobonds, several Mexican companies also sold "Yankee" bonds
- debt securities registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission - in 1993 and 1994.
2 All references hereinafter to amounts are to U.S. Dollars.
3 See supra Annex II - Selective List of Maturing Eurobonds of Private Sector Mexican
Issuers.
4 Cecile Gutscher, Banks, Construction Firms are Mexico's Most Vulnerable, LDC Debt Re-
port, Jan. 23, 1995, at 1.
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and short-term debt in the form of Euro-commercial paper and Euro-
certificates of deposit, which, collectively, accounted for approxi-
mately $33 billion of additional debt.5 In addition, the Mexican Gov-
ernment had approximately $90 billion of its own external debt.
6
Most of the outstanding Eurobond issues will mature, with bullet
payments,7 during the next three years. In 1995, for example, at least
fourteen major private sector issues matured, totaling close to $900
million.8 In 1996 and 1997, another twenty-five private sector issues
will mature, which together represent approximately $2.75 billion of
Mexican Eurobond indebtedness. In 1998, more than twenty Mexican
private sector issues will come due, aggregating another $3.7 billion of
indebtedness.9
Barring a substantial improvement in the Mexican economy or
the perceived creditworthiness of Mexican companies, many Mexican
issuers will find it difficult to redeem or refinance their Eurobonds as
they mature in 1995, 1996 and beyond. In addition, many of the Mexi-
can issuers of Eurobonds face substantial amortization and interest
payments on their bank debt. A number of these issuers are in default
currently under financial covenants in their Eurobonds or their bank
debt, which would give debt holders a legal right to accelerate the
debt.10 The inability of Mexican issuers to make these payments and
to comply with the terms of their debt obligations may trigger a wave
of debt restructuring and workouts long before many of the Eurobond
maturity payments are due.
Unless the international capital markets become widely receptive
to refinancing Mexican Eurobonds, by early to mid 1996, the holders
of these Eurobonds - Mexico's new "bondholder constituency" -
may find themselves at the center of a restructuring process encom-
passing a significant portion of the $13 billion of Eurobond debt out-
standing, as well as a sizable amount of the other $33 billion of foreign
5 Estimate for private sector holdings under Euro-CD and Euro-commercial paper pro-
grams obtained from First National Bank of Chicago's Emerging Markets Research Report on
Mexico, Jan. 13, 1995, at 1; estimate for bank debt obtained by subtracting outstanding private
sector Eurobonds, Euro-commercial paper and Euro-CD's from total private sector foreign debt
as estimated by the Mexican Finance Ministry (Secretarta de Hacienda y Cr~dito Publico).
6 Business Week (cover story), Mar. 20, 1995, drawing on data provided by the Mexican
Finance Ministry.
7 There are also a limited number of amortizing Eurobond issues.
8 See infra Annex II - Selective List of Maturing Eurobonds of Private Sector Mexican
Issuers.
9 See infra Annex II - Selective List of Maturing Eurobonds of Private Sector Mexican
Issuers.
10 See infra Part 6.
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currency-denominated debt owed by the Mexican corporate sector.
Indeed, as this article goes to press, Eurobond holders are engaged in
restructuring negotiations for hosiery maker Grupo Synkro, which de-
faulted on its $70 million Eurobond in October 1995. (In addition,
1995 saw defaults by conglomerate Grupo Sidek and flagship air car-
rier Aeromexico.)
Both bondholders and Mexican issuers are beginning to ask how
their restructuring negotiations will unfold and whether they will be
similar to past workout experiences, including:
" the restructurings in the United States of high yield bond debt in the
early 1990s, and
" the restructuring of billions of dollars of bank debt owed by Mexican
corporations in the mid-1980s.
B. Mexican Debt Restructuring During the 1980s
From the standpoint of U.S. bondholders, who wonder about the
likely Mexican approach to debt restructuring and workouts, there are
lessons to be learned from Mexico's experience with private sector
workouts in the mid-1980s, when approximately $14 billion of Mexi-
can corporate debt was restructured.11
Creditor Constituency. Most of the private sector debt restruc-
tured in the 1980s was owed to U.S. and Mexican banks. The banks
generally functioned through advisory committees consisting of bank
representatives that had both Mexican and U.S. counsel.
Magnitude of the Restructurings. During the period 1982-1988,
Mexico's private sector borrowers participated in a handful of very
large debt restructurings, each involving over $300 million of debt.
12
In addition, Mexican private sector companies participated in over
sixty workouts of substantial size, each involving the restructuring of,
on average, $50 to $100 million of debt. Finally, Mexican companies
11 For a very general discussion of Mexican private-sector debt restructuring agreements, see
Mexican Central Bank's Debt Program For Firms Gets Support, Dow Jones News Service -
Edited wall Street Journal Stories, Nov. 11, 1983, at Section 1, 31; and Karene Witcher, Banks
Give Ground on Mexico Debt Terms in Exchange for Close Watch on Economy, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 30, 1984, at Section 1, 23.
12 Among the largest private sector restructurings were those for Grupo Industrial Alfa, S.A.
(Grupo Alfa), a Monterrey-based conglomerate, and a number of its operating subsidiaries (in-
cluding steel producer Hylsa S.A. de C.V.), and for Valores Industriales, S.A. (Grupo Visa), a
Monterrey-based beverage company, and a number of its operating companies, including Fo-
mento Economico Mexicano, S.A. de C.V., the beer and soft drink bottler. In the mid-1980's,
Grupo Alfa restructured approximately $2.4 billion of debt and Grupo Visa restructured over $1
billion of debt, in each case involving debt contracted at both the holding company level and the
operating company level.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 16:117 (1995)
engaged in well over 100 smaller restructurings, where creditor claims
ranged, on average, from $15 to $20 million.
Deal Structure. In the vast majority of the restructurings, the cen-
tral feature was some type of "rollover" of corporate debt, with matu-
rities being extended while concessions were made in terms of interest
rate and amortization schedules. In addition, a number of companies
successfully negotiated a repurchase of their debt at a steep discount
from its face amount. In some cases, another central feature was the
sale of assets with the proceeds used for a partial paydown of debt.
Although there were only a handful of workouts involving an ex-
change of debt-for-equity, these workouts included some of the larg-
est and most visible corporate restructurings of the period.' 3
Bankruptcy Avoidance. In the Mexican workouts of the 1980s, it
was extremely rare to see negotiations collapse and a company enter
suspension of payments proceedings. Both debtors and creditors
viewed such proceedings as something to be avoided if at all possible.
Government Involvement. During the Mexican workouts of the
1980s, the Mexican Government introduced the Trust for Coverage of
Exchange Risk (Fideicomiso para la Cobertura de Riesgos
Cambiarios), or Ficorca, a trust fund through which the Government
encouraged private sector restructurings by providing foreign ex-
change coverage to Mexican debtors on restructured loans, so long as
the restructured loans included certain specified concessions related
to amortization, interest rates and extended maturities. 4
13 The Grupo Visa restructuring, completed in 1988, exemplifies these different restructuring
options. Grupo Visa and its various external creditors divided the global restructuring into sev-
eral distinct and more manageable restructurings, of which the largest were for the holding com-
pany - Valores Industriales S.A. (Visa) - and its largest operating subsidiary - Fomento
Economico Mexicano, S.A. de C.V. (FEMSA). In the Visa restructuring, creditors could ex-
change their overdue principal and interest of approximately $400 million for either cash at 46%
of face value or Mexican government securities at a similar discount. The cash payment was
funded in large part from asset sales. In the FEMSA restructuring, creditors could exchange
their overdue principal and interest of approximately $700 million for either cash at 42% of face
value, Mexican government securities at a similar discount, or new FEMSA notes. The FEMSA
cash payment was funded by new loans from the International Finance Corporation and
NAFINSA (a Mexican government development bank), existing cash and an equity infusion by
an affiliate of Citibank. See Visa Group Debt Package (summary of restructuring offer distrib-
uted to Grupo Visa creditors), Aug. 1, 1988.
14 Introduced by the Mexican Government in 1983, Ficorca offered Mexican private sector
debtors several options for covering the foreign exchange risk of restructured external debt. By
1982, private sector borrowings had soared to $19 billion and many companies began to default
on their debt-service payments. Mexican debtors were permitted to make peso deposits with the
Ficorca trust in respect of restructured external debt in exchange for the equivalent dollar
amount of such deposits at preferential exchange rates to be paid out over the term of the re-
structured debt. Although participating debtors were free to select among a number of payment
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C. Refinancing and Restructuring of Mexican Eurobonds
Despite very high local interest rates, most Mexican issuers hope
to be able to refinance through the Mexican banking community a
significant portion of their external debt. In addition, Mexican com-
panies hope that, prior to the maturity of their Eurobond debt, inves-
tors in the international capital markets will become receptive to the
issuance of new bonds to refinance their current debt. However, Mex-
ican banks themselves are currently confronting serious liquidity
problems, making questionable their availability as a refinancing
source in any significant fashion in the near term,15 and there is no
certainty as to when, and to what extent, the international capital mar-
kets will be willing to refinance outstanding Mexican Eurobond debt
for any but the most credit worthy borrowers with regular Dollar-doc-
terms (Ficorca mandated that all debtors negotiate with their external creditor as a condition for
participating in the program), the Mexican government required a minimum term of six years
with three years grace for principal payments. Approximately 1200 Mexican companies partici-
pated in Ficorca, covering almost $12 billion in external debt or about two-thirds of the total
external debt of Mexico's private sector. The payout schedule, however, proved to be unsustain-
able and in early 1987, Mexico and several foreign banks renegotiated the remaining $10.3 bil-
lion in Ficorca debt. For additional information, see Repayment of Principal, Guaranties Against
Inconvertibility, Business Int'l Investing Licensing of Trading, Aug. 1, 1989; Sergio A. Leiseca
and Thomas W. Studwell, Latin American Accounts Receivable: To Sue for Collection or to
Refinance?, 39 Bus. Law. 495 (Feb. 1984); External Payments and Debt, Country Profile, Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit, Nov. 1, 1993.
15 In April 1995, the Bank of Mexico implemented the Unidades de Inversion (UDI) pro-
gram, designed to assist overburdened Mexican corporate debtors and Mexican banks facing
liquidity problems in restructuring their loan portfolios. Under the program, non-performing
loans are refinanced with new loans denominated in UDIs, an accounting unit linked to the
Peso, to be funded by UDI-denominated deposits. UDI loans and UDI deposits are indexed to
the consumer price index, and carry a fixed real interest rate plus a margin. Restructured loans
are placed in a trust fund, which issues a UDI deposit instrument to the Bank of Mexico. The
UDI program allows loan repayments to be extended, and to be weighted more heavily toward
the end of the loan maturity. As of the end of August 1995, the UDI program had been unsuc-
cessful in relieving the debt servicing burden of Mexican companies and the overdue loan
problems of Mexican banks, and was widely considered an inadequate governmental response to
the crisis affecting Mexican corporate debtors and their Mexican bank creditors.
Responding in part to the ineffectiveness of the UDI program, in late August 1995, the
Mexican government introduced a new program designed to help overburdened Mexican debt-
ors. Under this program, the government and Mexican banks subsidize interest payments on all
outstanding loans for small and medium-size borrowers, by offering borrowers fixed-rate below-
market interest rates on credit card loans, consumer loans, mortgage loans and small business
loans, for the period September 1, 1995 through September 30, 1996. (For example, the interest
rate under qualifying credit card and consumer loans is 34%, and the rate under qualifying com-
mercial loans is 25%.) The cost of the program of almost $3 billion is split between the govern-
ment and Mexican banks. See International Financial Review 1097 (Sept. 2, 1995) at 74;
Emerging Markets Debt (Sept. 4, 1995) at 1.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 16:117 (1995)
umented cash flows.16 As a consequence, Mexican companies with
significant Eurobond and/or bank debt should not indefinitely post-
pone consideration of some restructuring strategy. Mexican debtors
likely would find the damages to their regulations to be less, and their
long-term access to the capital markets to be greater, if they were to
negotiate a settlement with bondholders and other creditors prior to
default.
PART 2
LEGAL AND INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS
A. The Courts
Until the late 1980s, Mexican insolvency proceedings could be in-
stituted in both Mexican federal and state courts.' 7 However, due to
the volume and complexity of insolvency proceedings in the Federal
District of Mexico (which encompasses Mexico City), special bank-
ruptcy courts (Juzgados de lo Concursal) were created in the Federal
District of Mexico in 1987, with jurisdiction over all suspension of pay-
ment and bankruptcy proceedings within the Federal District of Mex-
ico. Special bankruptcy judges are appointed by the Higher Court of
the Federal District (Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal)
for a six-year term.
B. Mexican Bankruptcy Law
In Mexico, insolvency proceedings are regulated by the Bank-
ruptcy and Suspension of Payments Law (the Ley de Quiebras y Sus-
pension de Pagos, or "Bankruptcy Law").' 8 Enacted in 1942 and most
recently amended in 1982, this statute contemplates two distinct types
16 Even if investors in the international capital markets are willing to purchase new refinanc-
ing bonds, the terms of such bonds, including interest rate, covenants and collateral, are almost
certain to be considerably less attractive than the terms of the outstanding bonds. During 1995,
the only Mexican companies generally able to access the international capital markets were ex-
porters .that secured their borrowings with export trade receivables or banks that secured their
borrowings with Dollar-denominated credit and receipts or workers' remittances receipts. Such
financing is considerably more complex and expensive than the Eurobond debt incurred in the
early 1990s.
17 Each state in Mexico has its own courts, while the federal court system is organized by
geographical regions. Each federal judicial circuit includes a court with jurisdiction over bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
18 Ley de Quiebras y de Suspension de Pagos [Law of Bankruptcy and Suspension of Pay-
ments in Mexico], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n (April 20, 1943) [hereinafter L.Q.S.P.], trans-
lated in 2 Doing Business in Mexico, pt VIII Documents, app. 8 (Andrea Bonime-Blanc &
William E. Mooz Jr., eds., Transnational Juris Publications, Inc. 1995); see also id., vol. 1, pt IX,
ch. 2 (general survey of the L.Q.S.P.).
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of proceedings, both of which are more fully discussed in Parts 7 and 8
of this article:
" Suspension of Payments proceedings (Suspension de Pagos),19 which
aim to rehabilitate the debtor and are roughly equivalent to a Chapter
11 reorganization under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.20
" Bankruptcy proceedings (Quiebra),21 which contemplate a total liqui-
dation of the debtor's business, and resemble a Chapter 7 liquidation
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.22
Some observers have suggested that Mexican companies with
Eurobond debt, so long as they have some meaningful business pres-
ence in the United States, may be able to reorganize under Chapter 11
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, thus entirely avoiding a reorganization
process under Mexico's Suspension of Payments proceedings. How-
ever, under Mexican law, any such reorganization would, to the extent
the subject company is domiciled in Mexico and has its principal place
of business in Mexico, only apply to such company's business presence
in the United States, and would have no "legal" reorganizational ef-
fects with regard to the company's Mexican businesses. 3
A new Mexican insolvency law, which would repeal and replace
the existing Bankruptcy Law, was prepared and circulated in 1995.
The Proposed New Insolvency Law does not contemplate a relief
mechanism such as the suspension of payments mechanism provided
by the Bankruptcy Law. As of the beginning of 1996, this proposed
new law did not appear likely to be considered soon by the Mexican
Congress.
C. U.S. Securities Laws
United States securities laws affect bondholders' rights to trade
Eurobonds issued by Mexican companies, to receive information
about the companies and to participate in certain restructurings, such
as debt exchanges, that might involve the bondholders' receipt of new
securities.
19 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, tits. VI, VII, VIII.
20 See 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
21 See L.Q.S.P., tits. I-V, VII, VIII.
22 See 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
23 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 13 and 14 (for U.S. judgment to be enforced, U.S. court
must have been competent under Mexican law; for U.S. court to be competent under Mexican
law, Mexican domicile of subject company must be deemed a sham and actual principal place of
business must be the United States); see also C6digo Civil para el Distrito Federal en Materia
Comtin y para todo Ia Repilblica en Materia Federal, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n (Septem-
ber 1, 1932), arts. 12,15 (II) and 28; C6digo de Comercio, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n (Octo-
ber 7-13, 1989), art. 1347-A (particularly III and VII).
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Although several Mexican companies have issued "Yankee"
bonds registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) under the U.S. Securities Act of 193324 (the Securities Act),
most debt securities issued by Mexican companies have been in the
form of unregistered Eurobonds. Almost all of the Eurobonds were
sold to either (a) offshore investors under an exemption from the re-
gistration requirements of the Securities Act offered by Regulation
S25 under the Securities Act or (b) U.S. "qualified institutional buy-
ers" (essentially institutional investors having assets of $100 million or
more) under the resale exemption offered by Rule 144A under the
Securities Act.26 Most Eurobonds are traded in the secondary market
among large institutions that qualify as "qualified institutional buyers"
under Rule 144A, and accordingly such resales qualify for the Rule
144A exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act.
27
Even though Mexican Eurobonds are not registered under the
Securities Act, they remain "securities" for purposes of the anti-fraud
provisions of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (the Ex-
change Act).29 Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act prohibits a bond-
holder from trading in Eurobonds while the bondholder possesses
material "inside" information about the issuer of the Eurobonds.30 As
a result, bondholders who become members of a Bondholders' Com-
mittee for a Mexican issuer, just like bondholders who are members of
a bondholders' committee for a U.S. issuer of high yield bonds, nor-
mally will become restricted from trading in the Eurobonds. Safe-
guards designed to permit trading are discussed in Part 3 below.
The trading restrictions of Rule 10b-5 apply only to the extent
that a bondholder has received material nonpublic information con-
cerning the issuer. However, bondholders may freely trade on pub-
licly available information. Most Mexican Eurobond issuers have
shares that are publicly traded in Mexico or, in many cases, in the
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq (1988).
25 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-904 (1994).
26 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A.
27 See generally Luis F. Moreno Trevino, Access to U.S. Capital Markets For Foreign Issuers:
Rule 144A Private Placements, 16 Hous. J. INr'L L. 159 (1993).
28 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1988).
29 With respect to Euro-securities sold in reliance on Regulation S under the Securities Act,
Preliminary Note 1 to Regulation S states that "[t]he following rules relate solely to the applica-
tion of Section 5 of [the Securities Act] and not to antifraud or other provisions of the federal
securities laws." Preliminary Notes preceding 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (1994). Preliminary Note 1 to
Rule 144A is substantially identical. Preliminary Notes preceding 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1994).
30 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
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United States (in the form of American Depositary Receipts), and are
required to comply with periodic reporting requirements of the Mexi-
can and/or U.S. securities authorities. In addition, some Eurobonds
contain contractual provisions obligating the Mexican issuer to pro-
vide quarterly and annual information as to its financial status. A
more detailed description of Mexican reporting requirements applica-
ble to Mexican companies is set forth in Section D, Part 2.
U.S. securities laws may also affect the restructuring options
available to a Mexican issuer in a workout, to the extent that the
workout contemplates issuing new debt or equity securities to bond-
holders. Any securities issued to bondholders in an exchange offer
must either be registered with the SEC under the Securities Act or,
preferably, qualified for an exemption from registration requirements
of the Securities Act.3 ' Eurobonds issued to bondholders in an ex-
change should qualify for the Regulation S and, depending on struc-
ture, 144A exemptions on which the original issuance of the
restructured Eurobonds relied. Registered equity and debt securities
issued to bondholders in an exchange may qualify for the exemption
afforded to certain exchange offers under Section 3(a)(9)31 of the Se-
curities Act, which provides issuers with an exemption for securities
issued to their existing security-holders.33 Exchanges for new debt or
equity securities are described in more detail in Part 4 below.
D. Reporting Requirements for Mexican Issuers
The Comisi6n Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNBV), the prin-
cipal securities regulator in Mexico, and the Bolsa Mexicana de
Valores, the Mexican stock exchange (the Bolsa), require most Mexi-
can public companies to file annual audited financial statements
(within 120 days after the end of the calendar year), quarterly
unaudited financial statements (within twenty business days after the
end of the first, second and third quarters and within forty-five busi-
ness days after the end of the fourth quarter), and announcements
regarding material corporate events and other material events which
31 New securities issued to bondholders as part of an exchange offer, whether registered with
the SEC or exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act, may have to be
registered with the Comisi6n Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (CNB V), Mexico's securities regu-
latory agency.
32 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1988).
33 See James E. Spiotto, The Applicability of the Exemption under Section 3(A)(10) of the
Securities Act to Debt Restructurings, Section 316(B) of the Trust Indenture Act, and Section
3(A)(9) Exchanges, in REAL ESTATE LAW & PRAcnrc COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 376
(Prac. L. Inst. Nov. 7-8, 1991).
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may affect the market value of the publicly traded securities they shall
have issued.34 The annual filing includes a current list of shareholders,
directors and officers and a list of holders of powers of attorney.
These filings are publicly available through the Bolsa.
Companies in industries such as banking, securities brokerage
and insurance are exempt from a number of such CNBV and Bolsa
filing requirements, because these industries are separately regulated
by other government agencies. The principal regulators of such com-
panies are in most cases required to provide such information to the
Bolsa, where it will be publicly available.
Mexican companies are often late in providing the required infor-
mation to the Bolsa. Historically, Mexican companies perceived little
risk in these delays, although the CNBV has recently begun to impose
more severe penalties. In addition, Mexican companies often fail to
provide the information in a useful format with comparisons to prior
periods, sometimes providing what resembles a computer tape
"dump" of information.
Mexican companies without public securities traded in Mexico
are not required to provide public information to the CNBV, and
creditors find it extremely difficult to obtain any useful information
about such private companies. Holders of Eurobonds issued by pri-
vate companies have virtually no legal access to financial or other in-
formation if the Eurobonds do not provide information-reporting
covenants.
PART 3
USE OF BONDHOLDER COMMITTEES
A. The Committee's Role in Restructurings
Because few Mexican companies, until relatively recently, had re-
lied on Eurobonds for external financing, Mexican issuers have had
few opportunities to negotiate anything of substance directly with
their bondholder constituency. The terms and conditions of most
Eurobonds of Mexican issuers have been negotiated between the issu-
ers and the lead underwriters for the Eurobonds; rarely, if ever, did
issuers discuss these issues directly with the investors purchasing the
bonds from the underwriters. Therefore, the issuers have no relevant
past experience to guide them on issues such as how to initiate discus-
34 See Ley del Mercado de Valores, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n (January 2,1975), arts. 14




sions with bondholders, who precisely to talk to and what types of
protocols should govern the dialogue.
If Mexican Eurobond issuers and holders of Mexican Eurobond
debt are going to have successful restructuring negotiations, they must
devise a vehicle through which useful discussions can take place. In
many cases, that vehicle may be an ad hoc "Bondholders Committee,"
which will be composed of the largest holders of the issuer's
Eurobond debt (with Committee members, ideally, owning at least a
majority of all bonds outstanding). This vehicle is likely to be similar
to the Bondholder Committees utilized in the U.S. junk bond restruc-
turings over the past few years.35 Such Committees offer several
advantages:
" Credibility. Bondholders are skeptical of a restructuring proposal
made by the issuer on a unilateral basis. The proposal is far more
credible if it is based on prior discussions with the largest bondholders,
functioning through a Bondholders Committee.
" Creditor Consensus. It is counter-productive for various individual
bondholders to each tell the issuer what they want to see in a restruc-
turing deal, because their opinions may be conflicting. Instead, the
bondholders can use the Committee as a forum to compare opinions
and forge a consensus view with respect to the essential economic
terms of an acceptable restructuring proposal.
" Identifying Other Holders. The numerous smaller holders of
Eurobond debt also must be identified since their support for any re-
structuring proposal will be important. Bondholder Committees have
a proven track record of being able to network within the bondholder
community, identify smaller holders and gain their confidence.
" Deal Endorsement. Finally, if a restructuring agreement is reached
with a Committee of the largest holders, the agreement tends to be
viewed as an important endorsement of the deal, and smaller holders
are far more inclined to be supportive.
B. Organizational Issues
Within the U.S. context, Bondholder Committees usually have
been formed in response to an initiative by the issuer of the bonds
(the Company), often because it faces an imminent coupon payment
default. Typically, the Company convenes an informal meeting of its
35 For a general overview of creditors' committees, see Marta G. Andrews, The Chapter 11
Creditors' Committea" Statutory Watchdog?, 2 BAK. DEv. J. 247 (1985). For a description of
how Bondholder Committees have operated in the context of U.S. junk bond restructurings, see
James E. Spiotto, Analysis of Defaults and Remedies for Indenture Trustees and Bondholders,
REAL ESrATE LAW & PRACrIcE CoURsE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 399 (Prac. L. Inst. Feb. -
March 1994); and Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232
(1987).
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largest bondholders, provides them with an operational and financial
update and then urges the group to meet among themselves and select
the membership of a Bondholders Committee.
As part of this process, the Company also is expected to "recog-
nize" the Bondholders Committee. This means that the Company is
committed to look to the Committee as the principal vehicle through
which it will negotiate and communicate with the bondholder constit-
uency. The Company also is expected to provide the Committee with
all information necessary to evaluate restructuring alternatives.
Because Mexican issuers of Eurobonds have little or no experi-
ence with Bondholder Committees, it is unlikely that they will take
the initiative in the process of Committee formation. A far more
likely scenario is for the issuer's largest bondholders to network
among themselves and gradually build a coalition of concerned hold-
ers who can function as an ad hoc Committee. At that point, advisors
to the Committee also can be selected and should include both U.S.
and Mexican legal counsel, and possibly financial or accounting
advisors.
Once the Committee is formed and has advisors, there are several
steps it should take before speaking with the Company:
" Identify Holdings. The Eurobond positions of each Committee mem-
ber should be clearly established and, if possible, other large holders
identified and incorporated into the Committee's membership. Ide-
ally, the Committee members together should own at least 51% of all
bonds outstanding.
" Gather/Compare Information. The Company's available financial re-
ports should be gathered and Committee members should share
whatever additional information they may have learned. Advisors
also can compile and analyze information about the Company's indus-
try and competitors.
" Analysis of Legal Documents. The advisors should analyze the rights
of the bondholders as set forth in the applicable fiscal agency agree-
ment or indenture. If there is other significant debt, such as bank
debt, the Company's operative loan agreements should be obtained
and reviewed. In addition, creditors' rights issues under Mexican law
should be studied.
" Restructuring Alternatives. While restructuring alternatives may be
explored on a preliminary basis, it will be premature to reach many
conclusions until additional information from the Company is
obtained.
C. Interaction with the Company
Once the Committee is formed, and has completed its prelimi-
nary analysis, it has several tactical options. First, it can simply take a
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"wait and see" attitude, knowing that bondholders are now better pre-
pared to deal with future developments. Second, if there are other
major creditor groups, such as banks, the Committee can initiate dis-
cussions with them to explore issues of common concern.
Finally, the Committee can open up talks directly with the Com-
pany. In that event the bondholders' objectives could include the
following:
" Send a message that the Committee is not seeking immediate confron-
tation, but rather seeks cooperation from the Company in providing
additional information.
" Indicate that the Committee has no definitive views on the elements
of a possible restructuring-or whether one is even necessary-and
merely wants to explore alternatives.
" Seek payment of the Committee's advisors by the Company, which
has been customary in U.S. restructurings of public debt where a
Bondholders Committee has been involved.
" If in-depth restructuring negotiations are likely, define a working
group of Committee members and Company representatives who will
serve as the focal point for these talks.
D. Handling Non-Public Information
As already noted, Mexican Eurobonds remain subject to the anti-
fraud provisions of the U.S. federal securities law (e.g., Rule 10b-5
under the Exchange Act). Therefore, it would be a violation of U.S.
law for select bondholders to obtain non-public information from a
Mexican issuer or from parties (such as directors or advisors) deemed
to have non-public information and proceed to sell their bonds or
otherwise trade in the issuer's securities.3 6 In addition, any party
(whether or not a bondholder) who obtains non-public information
from a Mexican issuer, or from parties (such as directors or advisors)
deemed to have non-public information, and thereafter buys or sells in
the issuer's securities traded in Mexico before such information is
deemed to be public, would be in violation of Mexican insider trading
rules.37
Once bondholders "become restricted," they must refrain from
further trading until the non-public information that they have re-
ceived is publicly disclosed.38 These regulations could present a
36 For more information on the application of insider trading laws to members of Creditors'
Committees, see Mark J. Krudys, Insider Trading By Members of Creditors' Committees: Action-
able!, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 69 (1994).
37 Ley del Mercado de Valores, Diario Oficial de ]a Federaci6n (Jan. 2,1975), arts. 16 Bis, 16
Bis-1, 16 Bis-2 and 52 Bis-2.
38 Id.
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thorny problem for holders of Mexican Eurobonds who become part
of a Bondholders Committee that seeks non-public information from
a Mexican issuer.
Essentially the same problem has confronted members of Bond-
holder Committees functioning in the context of U.S. public debt
restructurings.39 They have successfully dealt with the issue in several
ways, which may have application to Bondholder Committees func-
tioning in the Mexican context:
" Advisors and Subcommittees. A Committee can agree that only its
advisors and a few select Committee members will have access to non-
public information. All that they will convey to the Committee at
large is their recommended negotiating strategy, but not the detailed
information on which it is based.
" Postpone Restricted Status. In the final phase of restructuring negotia-
tions, often all Committee members agree to become restricted - but
only for a period of a few days to conclude the restructuring
agreement.
• Mandated Disclosure. On occasion, a Committee and an issuer in re-
structuring agree that when their negotiations are concluded the issuer
will publicly disclose all non-public information furnished to the
Committee.
" Information-Blocking Devices. Under the so-called "Chinese Wall"
approach, the Committee member receiving non-public information is
insulated by strict internal procedures from other colleagues who re-
main free to trade.40 This approach has been approved for Bond-




For Mexican companies contemplating a restructuring of their
Eurobond debt, there are a number of restructuring alternatives.42
39 See Robert C. Pozen, Creditors' Committees and Insider Trading, in CORPORAr LAw &
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 828 (Prac. L. Inst. Nov. 4-6, 1993) (distributed at the
25th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation).
40 See Robert C. Pozen and Judy K. Mencher, Chinese Walls For Creditors' Committees, 48
Bus. LAW. 747 (Feb. 1993).
41 See In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 1-90-00130, 1992 Bankr. Lexis 392 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio Mar. 7, 1991).
42 For a more thorough description of the various alternatives for restructuring debt, as ap-
plied in the context of sovereign debt management, see Douglas A. Doetsch, Developing Coun-
try Debt" A Summary of the Recent Impact on Commercial Banks, 1 Tim FINANcER: ACMT,
No. 3, Aug. 1994. See also Lee C. Buccheit, Documentation Issues and Alternative Techniques of
Debt Restructuring, in LATIN AMERICA SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT (Ralph Reisner,
Emilio J. Cardenas and Antonio Mendes eds., InterAmerican Dev. Bank 1990); Robert Kenneth
MacCallum, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Rights and Duties of Commercial Banks Inter
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Many of these alternatives were successfully used in both the Mexican
private sector restructurings of the 1980s, as well as the U.S. high yield
bond restructurings of the early 1990s.
A. Covenant Relief
In order to achieve relief from temporary liquidity problems, one
restructuring alternative for a Mexican issuer would be to seek
amendments of, or waivers from compliance with, restrictive non-
monetary covenants contained in the agreement which governs the
terms of the issuer's Eurobonds.
The contractual rights of the holders of Mexican Eurobonds, as
more fully discussed in Part 5, are governed either by a Fiscal Agency
Agreement (which is customarily used with Eurobonds governed by
New York law) or a Trust Agreement (which is customarily used with
Eurobonds governed by English law), both of which can be viewed as
somewhat shorter versions of the qualified trust indentures that gov-
ern bonds issued publicly in the United States.
Like bonds issued under a qualified trust indenture, Eurobonds
issued under a Fiscal Agency Agreement or a Trust Agreement typi-
cally require the unanimous consent of each affected bondholder in
order to amend any of the monetary terms of the Eurobonds. How-
ever, Eurobonds issued under Fiscal Agency Agreements and Trust
Agreements also include a set of non-monetary covenants that restrict
various activities of the issuer, and these covenants typically may be
amended and liberalized by a vote of a simple majority of the
bondholders.
While covenant relief may be one part of the restructuring pro-
cess, it will not be sufficient to address the most serious financial
problems of certain Mexican issuers.
B. New Money/Refinancing
A second restructuring alternative is the redemption or repur-
chase at a discount of the issuer's Eurobonds with funds provided
through the issuance of new debt securities or new bank financing.
In the current environment, few Mexican companies are in a posi-
tion to issue new debt securities, whether they are denominated in
foreign currency or Mexican Pesos (Pesos).
Sese, 1987 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 425; Michael Chamberlin et al., Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988
U. Iii. L. REv. 415 (1988); Ricki Rhodarmer ligert, Recent Regulatory Perspectives on Debt-
For-Equity Swaps and Securitization of Third World Debt 1988 U. ILL L. REv. 481 (1988); Ralph
Reisner, et al., International DebM" Focus on Mexico, 82 AM. Soc' INT'L L. PRoc. 478.
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In the near term, the market for dollar-denominated bank loans
also appears to be inaccessible to all but the most creditworthy Mexi-
can companies with liquid and readily available collateral. Very few
banks (primarily large foreign banks with long-standing commitments
to Latin America) have evidenced a willingness to extend significant
credit to Mexican companies, and then only for their largest and most
creditworthy customers.
The market for bank loans denominated in Pesos appears to be
slightly more promising, although the loans have limited appeal to
Mexican companies since they are characterized by high rates of inter-
est (often in excess of 70% during the first six months of 1995), short
maturities (often less than thirty days), and potentially onerous collat-
eral requirements.
However, as more Mexican companies face the prospect of de-
faulting on their Eurobonds and other external debt at maturity, the
Mexican Government may step up its involvement. Indeed, some ob-
servers expect that the Government will exert substantial pressure on
the largest Mexican banks to provide the Mexican corporate sector
with meaningful amounts of new financing, presumably Peso-
denominated.
In theory, the other source of new money would be the control-
ling shareholders of Mexican issuers, many of whom are among the
most wealthy families in Mexico. While some of these families may
have the net worth to recapitalize the companies they control, some
observers point out that such net worth may not be liquid, and the
controlling shareholders may be hesitant to make large new money
investments.
C. Sale of Assets/Additional Collateral
Most of the larger Mexican companies have been successful at
borrowing on an unsecured basis. Consequently, substantially all
Eurobond debt currently outstanding, and much of the Peso-
denominated Mexican corporate bank debt, is unsecured.
With a potentially large base of valuable and unencumbered as-
sets, several Mexican companies, including some that have issued
Eurobonds, may be in a position to (i) sell non-essential assets and use
proceeds to pay down Eurobond debt, or (ii) collateralize their
Eurobond debt so that holders will have a new secured obligation.
It should be noted, however, that if a Mexican issuer was pre-
pared to collateralize its Eurobonds, it almost certainly would seek
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concessions on other terms of the indebtedness - such as a reduced
interest rate and an extended maturity.
D. Exchange Offer for New Debt
A fourth restructuring alternative is a debt-for-debt exchange,
pursuant to an exchange offer. During the course of the next year,
this type of exchange offer may well become one of the more fre-
quently utilized techniques for implementing restructuring agree-
ments between Mexican issuers of Eurobonds and their bondholder
constituency.43 In many of these transactions, current holders of
Eurobonds will swap into new debt securities that have an extended
maturity. If they make such concessions, bondholders probably will
demand that their new Eurobonds (i) become collateralized, (ii) have
more restrictive covenants, and (iii) if possible, have a gradual amorti-
zation through a new sinking fund feature. In addition, the bondhold-
ers may seek a sizable amount of the post-restructuring equity, thus
diluting the ownership position of existing shareholders.
As noted above, any securities issued to bondholders in an ex-
change offer must either be registered with the SEC or, preferably,
qualify for an exemption from registration requirements.' If the new
securities are Eurobonds issued to offshore bondholders, the ex-
change should qualify for the exemption provided by Regulation S on
which the original issuance of the restructured Eurobonds relied. If
the new securities are Eurobonds issued to U.S. institutional investors,
the exchange might qualify for an exemption under Section 4(2) of the
Securities Act45 (if the number of investors was limited) or Rule
43 Aeromexico's June 1995 debt exchange is the first significant example since the Peso de-
valuation of a Mexican debt for debt exchange offer. In the Aeromexico restructuring, holders
of approximately $138 million of Aeromexico's Eurobonds and Euro-commercial paper ex-
changed their existing securities, which matured in June 1995, for the same principal amount of
new 5-year securities. Surprisingly, Aeromexico's Mexican bank creditors - whose debt was
paripassu with the Euro-securities debt - converted their debt to equity, essentially subordinat-
ing their future claims to those of the holders of Euro-securities. (Some participants in the re-
structuring, including one of the authors of this article, believe that the primary reason that
Mexican banks were willing to subordinate their claims was due to the difficulty of locating the
holders of the Euro-securities in order to negotiate effectively.) Aeromexico had conditioned
the exchange offer on receiving acceptances from Euro-securities holders owning 95% in princi-
pal amount of Euro-securities, and had threatened to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in a U.S.
bankruptcy court if the 95% threshold was not obtained. International Financial Review, 1090
(July 15, 1995).
44 For a brief overview of how some securities may qualify for an exemption from registra-
tion requirements, see Richard H. Rowe, Certain Issues As to Securities Laws Exemptions in
Restructuring and Reorganization Transactions, Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series (Prac. L. Inst.) March - April 1991.
45 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988).
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144A4 6 under the Securities Act (if an underwriter agreed to purchase
and then resell the new securities only to "qualified institutional buy-
ers"). Alternatively, equity and debt securities which are registered
with the SEC and issued to bondholders in an exchange may qualify
for the exchange offer exemption under Section 3(a)(9)47 of the Secur-
ities Act, which provides issuers with an exemption for securities is-
sued to their existing security-holders so long as no compensation is
paid to a financial advisor or other agent for soliciting the exchange.48
While exchange offers are a reasonably efficient transaction, they
have one practical drawback, which relates to investors commonly
known as "holdouts." These investors refuse to tender their bonds
into an exchange offer because they assume, often correctly, that if the
transaction is completed, their "old bonds" will become more valuable
because the issuer's balance sheet will have been improved.
When the holdout group becomes sizable- representing 10% or
more of the bonds outstanding- the holdouts tend to thwart the ex-
change offer because issuers are reluctant to complete the deal if a
large block of old debt remains outstanding. Mexican issuers of
Eurobond debt who are considering exchange offers may confront the
holdout problem, which in their case will be exacerbated by the fact
that many Eurobond issues include "bearer bonds" whose owners are
difficult to identify and communicate with.
Within the context of the restructuring of U.S. public debt issues,
the holdout problem eventually was addressed through the increased
use of "prepackaged" Chapter 11 Plans. This solution, and the ques-
tion of whether it could be adapted to Mexican transactions, is dis-
cussed below in Section G, Part 4.
E. Exchange Offer for New Equity and the Use of ADRs
A fifth restructuring alternative would involve the exchange of
some portion of a Mexican issuer's Eurobonds for new equity in the
Mexican issuer.4 9
If the U.S. experience with exchange offers is any guide, it is un-
likely that U.S. holders of Mexican Eurobonds will be prepared to
swap their position entirely for new equity in any Mexican issuer.
46 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1994).
47 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1988). See supra note 32.
48 See generally Bradley Jay Gans, The Mechanics of Rule 144A/Regulation S Underwriting,
in CORPO'ATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SEuiEs No. 879 (Prac. L. Inst. Feb. 1995).
49 For additional information regarding debt-for-equity programs, see Robert D. Sloan, The




Most observers agree that if the Mexican economy continues to dete-
riorate, the holders of Eurobonds are far more secure if they maintain
their position as a creditor, as opposed to moving down the capital
structure to become shareholders.
However, a look at the U.S. restructurings of public debt over the
past few years reveals that bondholders of U.S. issuers often were will-
ing to convert large blocks of bond debt into equity. To some extent
this philosophy may prevail with the holders of Mexican Eurobonds,
who may be influenced by the favorable results generally obtained by
creditors accepting equity in several large Mexican restructurings of
the 1980s.50 This process may be facilitated by the recent liberaliza-
tion of Mexican foreign investment laws, which permit majority for-
eign investment in approximately 80% of the Mexican economy, with
only a few strategic areas still reserved to the Mexican Government
and Mexican nationals.
5 1
Mexican issuers could choose to use in an exchange either (i)
common stock or "limited voting stock" in the form which it is traded
in Mexico on the Bolsa, (ii) common stock in the form of American
Depositary Receipts (ADRs), or (iii) "neutral stock," which is com-
mon stock with limited voting rights and which, under Mexico's 1993
Foreign Investment Law, is not computed as foreign investment in de-
termining the percentage participation of foreign investment in a
Mexican company. 2 "Limited voting stock" may only be issued by
public companies with the prior approval of the CNBV, which in most
cases would not permit "limited voting stock" to exceed 25% of the
outstanding capital stock of a Mexican company. 3 "Neutral stock"
may be issued with the prior approval of the National Commission of
Foreign Investments (NCFI).54 The NCFI has not yet defined the per-
centage that "neutral stock" may represent in a Mexican company,
nor the matters in which "neutral stock" may be permitted to vote.
The lack of definition may allow a Mexican Eurobond issuer to tailor
50 There are, however, significant dissimilarities between the' debt crisis in Mexico in the
1980s, where debt-equity conversions were negotiated by small advisory committees consisting
of banks, and the current situation in Mexico, where the ownership of Eurobonds is diverse and
widespread, and may make negotiation of any conversion into equity more difficult.
51 See generally Augustin Berdeja-Prieto, Mexico Streamlines Foreign Investment Law, 8
INT'L FiN. L. REv. 31 (Feb. 1994); Michell Nader and Jorge Cervantes Trejo, Mexico Liberalizes
Foreign Investment Regime, 4 MEaxico TRADE & L. REP., Mar. 1, 1994.
52 Ley de Inversion Extranjera [Foreign Investment Law], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n
(Dec. 27, 1993), translated in FOREIGN INv smNrT LAv OF MEXaco, 3-6, 8.17 (Carl Smith Ball
Garcia Cachoy Asociados, S.C. trans, 1993) [hereinafter FoREMN IN sMENT LAW].
53 FOREIGN INvEsTMENr LAW, supra note 52.
54 FoREIGN INvEsTmENT LAW, supra note 52, art. 20.
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with the NCFI each proposed conversion of Eurobonds into "neutral
stock." Where a public company is to issue "neutral stock," the prior
approvals of the CNBV and the NCFI will be required.
Additionally, any conversion of Mexican Eurobonds into any
type of Mexican equity securities (i) for an actual consideration of
approximately $25 million or more, or (ii) which would represent 35%
or more of the equity of a Mexican company with annual sales of ap-
proximately $25 million or more, or (iii) in which the Mexican com-
pany and the party or parties converting the Mexican Eurobonds into
equity have combined assets or sales of more than $100 million, would
require clearance from the new Mexican Antitrust Commission.
Most Eurobond holders probably would prefer to receive ADRs
rather than Mexican common stock, because the ADRs are denomi-
nated in dollars and (if registered with the SEC) can be easily traded
in the United States. Presumably, bondholders would value ADRs
more highly than Mexican capital stock due to the better liquidity of
ADRs, leading bondholders to agree to a more favorable exchange
ratio for ADRs as compared to Mexican equity securities. Mexican
issuers presumably would weigh this exchange ratio against the costs
of compliance with U.S.-style disclosure standards and, possibly, an
SEC registration in determining the optimal equity "currency" in an
exchange.
It is unclear whether Mexican issuers would be able to rely on
Section 3(a)(9) under the Securities Act as an exemption permitting
an unregistered exchange offer for new ADRs. Section 3(a)(9) re-
quires that the issuer of the new securities issued in the exchange offer
be identical to the issuer of the old securities, and the issuer of ADRs
technically would be the bank depositary, not the Mexican company
that had issued the Eurobonds. If the SEC determined that Section
3(a)(9) did not permit an unregistered exchange offer for new ADRs,
the ADRs could only be issued pursuant to an effective registration
statement approved by the SEC, which would substantially increase
the cost of, and lengthen the time needed for, an exchange.56 Alterna-
tively, the ADRs could be issued in an exchange pursuant to an ex-
emption from the registration requirements provided by Regulation
S57 or Regulation D/Rule 144A, either of which would limit secondary
55 Ley Federal de Competencia Econ6mica, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n (Dec. 24, 1992),
arts 16, 20. (These threshhold amounts are expressed in terms of a multiple of daily minimum
wages in Mexico City, and assume a daily minimum wage in Mexico City of approximately $2.)
56 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1988).
57 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-904 (1994).
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market trading in the ADRs, since each exemption imposes certain
restrictions upon transfers."8
F. Equity Investment by a Strategic Investor
A sixth restructuring alternative contemplates an equity invest-
ment by a strategic investor. U.S. or other international companies
operating in the same industry as a Mexican debtor may already be
familiar with the Mexican debtor, and have a view as to the long-term
viability of the debtor company. These companies may be willing to
invest quickly in companies facing leverage problems like those now
common in Mexico. A sale of equity to a strategic investor typically
requires, at a minimum, three to six months from the beginning of the
search for an investor until the closing of the acquisition.
Debtors contemplating a sale of equity to a possible strategic in-
vestor typically would engage an investment bank or other advisor to
assist in the sale. The advisors would assist the debtor in determining
the optimal size and structure of the required investment. Considera-
tions would include the size of the investment, common vs. preferred
stock, representation on the board of directors for the investor and
other control issues.
In addition to preparing an information memorandum and con-
tacting potential investors, the advisors would assist the debtor in ne-
gotiating final terms of a stock purchase agreement and, typically, a
shareholders' agreement with the investor and other major sharehold-
ers. After closing of the sale, the proceeds of the sale presumably
would be applied to repay debt.
Creditors of the Mexican debtor - including representatives of a
bondholders' committee - generally would participate in these nego-
tiations in order to assure themselves that the terms of the new invest-
ment are sufficient to restore the financial health of the debtor and to
ensure that the investment package does not include terms that may
be adverse to their senior position (e.g., management fees or preferred
dividends to be paid to the strategic investor). Equally as important,
creditors must assure the strategic investor that they are comfortable
with the debtor's proposed new capital structure and have waived
and/or amended their credit agreement or indenture so that no default
will occur upon or shortly after closing the equity investment.
58 See generally Gans, supra note 48.
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G. Variation of a "Prepackaged Plan"
A seventh restructuring alternative contemplates the possible
use, in a suspension of payments proceeding, of a previously negoti-
ated plan of reorganization similar to a Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan
of Reorganization.
Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plans - or "prepacks" - were one of
the most innovative techniques to emerge from the wave of U.S. pub-
lic debt restructurings in the early 1990s.59 Simply stated, prepacks
aimed to expedite the process of developing the Plan of Reorganiza-
tion, which is the legal document that compromises and resolves credi-
tor claims and leads to an exit from a Chapter 11 reorganization.
Absent some negotiations with creditors before a Chapter 11 Petition
is filed, it often takes years to formulate a consensual Plan and con-
clude a large Chapter 11 case.
In a prepack transaction, the Company - before entering bank-
ruptcy - negotiates an acceptable Plan with its bondholders and
sometimes other major creditor groups. In advance of the bankruptcy
filing, the Company also drafts the proposed Plan, has creditors vote
on it and obtains the necessary Plan acceptances.
Then, when the Company files its Chapter 11 Petition, it is able to
advise the Bankruptcy Court that there already exists an acceptable
Plan approved by creditors. This prepack procedure typically short-
ens the entire bankruptcy process to less than 90 days.
Prepacks also are an effective way to deal with the previously
noted problem of "holdout" bondholders who do not want to accept
the restructuring deal. In a prepack, the bondholders, as a class, are
deemed to have accepted the Plan if only two thirds in dollar amount
and a majority in number (of those voting) vote in favor of the Plan.6"
Hence, bondholder holdouts who control only a small percentage of
the bonds will simply be outvoted and will be forced, in effect, to ac-
cept the same consideration that all bondholders are to receive under
the Plan.
Given the many advantages of prepacks, some observers have
asked whether a variation of a prepack could be adapted to imple-
ment restructuring agreements between Mexican issuers of
Eurobonds and their bondholder constituencies. There are several el-
59 See David M. Friedman, et al. Pre-packaged Plans of Reorganization, in CORPORATE LAW
& PRACCE COURSE HANDBOOK SERnEs No. 733 (Prac. L. Inst. April, 1991).
60 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988).
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ements of the Mexican Bankruptcy Law which suggest that this may
be possible:
- In its suspension of payments proceeding, Mexican law already pro-
vides for the rough- equivalent of a Chapter 11 reorganization.
61
- One of the central features of the Mexican proceeding is a "Prevent-
ative Agreement." 62 Like a Plan of Reorganization, this aims to de-
scribe how creditors' claims are to be compromised and resolved.
- The Preventative Agreement is viewed as a proposal by the debtor,
and it is supposed to be filed on the same day that the Suspension of
Payments case is commenced.63
- However, there is nothing to stop the debtor and its creditors from
negotiating acceptable terms for the Preventative Agreement before
the suspension of payments proceeding begins.
If an entirely consensual Preventative Agreement was presented
to the Mexican bankruptcy court on the first day of the suspension of
payments proceeding, the process of creditor voting on the Agree-
ment, and its final approval by the court, should be expedited. Hence,
a successful and "fast track" proceeding would become far more likely
- producing results roughly analogous to a "prepackaged" Chapter
11 proceeding.
H. Judicial Reorganization
If some type of out-of-court restructuring agreement cannot be
achieved between a Mexican issuer of Eurobonds and its bondholder
constituency, the last alternative is to attempt to reorganize the com-
pany under Mexican Bankruptcy Law. Consistent with creditors' be-
havior in the 1980s in Mexico, bondholders probably will resort to
Mexican bankruptcy court as a last resort.
A suspension of payments proceeding is obviously preferable in
most instances since its objective is rehabilitation of the issuer,
whereas a Bankruptcy Proceeding usually results in a total liquidation
of the business. But any such proceeding should be avoided if at all
possible, for the following reasons:
" Suspension of payments proceedings may be time-consuming, often
taking at least two years to complete where a reorganization arrange-
ment cannot be expediently reached.
" While a Chapter 11 filing in the U.S. no longer carries heavy negative
connotations for the debtor and its business, a suspension of payments
filing in Mexico stigmatizes the debtor and can be extremely harmful
to its reputation in the Mexican business community.
61 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, tits. VI, VII, VIII.
62 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 398-402.
63 L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 398.
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PART 5
THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS
A. The Major Constituencies
During the course of an out-of-court restructuring of Mexican
Eurobond debt, the bondholders must deal with several different con-
stituencies, each of which has its own distinct agenda.
The Company. If the Company's debt is unmanageable, but its
operations are reasonably sound, then the bondholders' priority will
be to help develop a more appropriate capital structure. If they en-
counter delays, it probably means that (i) there are core operational
problems, (ii) the Company is not providing quality information to
creditors, or (iii) some constituency is adamantly resisting the restruc-
turing. If any of these factors are present, the creditors will have to
take greater control of the workout process.
Bank Debt. Many Mexican companies have both secured and un-
secured bank debt. Generally, medium term bank debt of Mexican
companies is dollar-denominated and is fully secured, while short
term bank debt is Peso-denominated and is unsecured. All such un-
secured bank debt is pari passu with the unsecured Eurobond debt of
such companies, and, as a consequence, banks holding unsecured debt
and bondholders should have many common interests and should be
able to develop a close working relationship in any restructuring.
Trade Creditors. Mexican companies vary in the extent to which
they have dollar-denominated trade debt. However, even where there
is not a large amount of trade debt, most Mexican companies can be
expected to have numerous individual trade creditors. It will be logis-
tically difficult to obtain concessions from the entire group, on an out-
of-court basis, and hence deep discounting of these creditor claims
should not be expected.
Shareholders. If holders of Eurobonds are expected to accept
new debt instruments with extended maturities, then they almost cer-
tainly will expect to receive a meaningful amount of new equity. This
may lead to conflict with existing shareholders, who would be diluted.
Mexico does not have a system that permits automatic conversion of
debt into equity with only a Board of Directors' authorization. Thus,
any proposed conversion would require the approval of the control-
ling shareholders of the Company.
The Government. At present there is no indication that the Gov-
ernment plans to institute anything comparable to its Ficorca program
from the mid-1980s and set minimum acceptable terms for creditor
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concessions. Nevertheless, some version of substantial Governmental
"activism" or "oversight" may emerge, related either to financial in-
ducements to Mexican banks (beyond those set forth in the UDI and
ADE programs described in Part I, Section C of this article) to extend
payment terms on existing debt to Mexican borrowers or to a restruc-
turing of debt owed to Mexican development banks.
Labor. Struggling Mexican companies will probably have labor
problems (Le., massive labor force reductions, delay of payment of
salaries or benefits). Labor organizations have access to special labor
tribunals where they have standing to protect workers' contractual,
statutory and traditional rights. Like tax claims of the Government,
the claims of labor will often have priority over unsecured, and some-
times even secured, creditor claims.
Joint Venture Partners. Many Mexican companies participate in
one or more joint ventures with U.S. or other foreign companies.
Often, Mexican companies rely on their joint venture partners for fi-
nancial and/or technological assistance that is critical to their long-
term business health. These joint venture partners may be a source of
new financing. In addition, joint venture partners may have to ap-
prove the broad terms of any financial restructuring, either due to the
express terms of a joint venture or similar agreement or as a practical
necessity based on the importance of the venture.
B. Evaluating the Business
If a restructuring involves a Mexican Company that is operation-
ally sound, with solid management, then the evaluation of its business
should not be a controversial or overly time-consuming process. What
is presented, simply stated, is a "good company/bad balance sheet,"
requiring the Company to re-engineer its capital structure.
On the other hand, in restructuring some Mexican companies the
creditors may confront significant operational problems, which are
likely to fall into one of three broad categories:
- the Company needs new management;
- the Company needs to redefine its core business, which probably will
lead to disposition of non-core assets; or
- the Company needs to redefine its core markets and core customer
base, which may lead to a downsizing of some part of the corporate
infrastructure.
In order to intelligently address these types of problems, the
Company probably will find itself in some type of strategic planning
exercise, developing a "new business plan" with long-term financial
projections. In that event, creditors should develop positions on (i)
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how long they think the planning process should last, (ii) how much it
should cost, (iii) which members of senior management should be in-
volved, and (iv) whether the creditors want to offer their own in-
dependent recommendations. The Company and its creditors must
strike a balance between detail and expeditiousness in developing any
such business plan, in order to assure that the plan development exer-
cise is not used as a stalling mechanism by the Company, which might
then prompt certain creditors to institute legal action against the
Company.
C. Developing the Restructuring Agreement
As previously noted, most Mexican issuers of Eurobond debt
have other significant constituencies besides the bondholders. They
may well have bank debt, they almost certainly will have trade credi-
tors, and they all will have shareholders. The most useful restructur-
ing agreements will address every one of those interests, so that the
entire capital structure is fixed definitively.
If the terms of the Eurobond debt are to be restructured, the re-
structuring is likely to occur through negotiations between the Com-
pany and some type of Bondholders Committee. If an acceptable deal
is reached, it is likely to be reflected in some sort of "term sheet."
That document, in turn, will provide the basis for preparation of ex-
change offer materials, assuming that is the chosen means of deal
implementation.
If the issuer also has bank debt, then there will be a separate set
of negotiations over the terms of that indebtedness, conducted be-
tween the Company and bank representatives. It is unlikely that the
bondholders would directly participate in these talks, but they should
coordinate with the banks since both creditor groups will have many
common interests. Assuming an agreement is reached with the banks,




Mexican Eurobond holders' leverage in restructuring negotia-
tions will be determined largely by their legal rights under the
Eurobond documentation, as well as by the bondholders' relative
rights upon a suspension of payments or bankruptcy filing. Like
bonds issued under a qualified Trust Indenture governing registered
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debt securities issued in the United States, Eurobonds issued under a
Fiscal Agency Agreement or a Trust Agreement are subject to a pack-
age of operating and, in some cases, financial covenants designed to
restrict activities of the issuer that could impair its creditworthiness
and thus the credit quality of the bonds.
The covenant package of most Mexican Eurobond issues is com-
paratively limited in scope, but it should include most of the following
provisions:
Merger and Asset Dispositions. Typically the Company is prevented
from a merger or consolidation with another entity, or the sale of sub-
stantially all of its assets to another entity, unless that entity expressly
assumes the Company's Eurobond indebtedness.
Ratable Security. Typically, Eurobonds are unsecured. Thus, there
is a covenant providing that no lien may be created as security for other
indebtedness unless the bondholders' debt also becomes equally and rat-
ably secured.
Limits on Additional Debt. While the incurrence of additional debt
is rarely prohibited, it often is conditioned on the satisfaction of speci-
fied financial ratios. There also can be limited "carve outs" that permit
the Company, for example, to guarantee the indebtedness of its
subsidiaries.
Financial Maintenance Tests. Sometimes there is a covenant that
obliges the Company to comply with some financial test - such as a
debt-to-equity ratio - which is considered indicative of a reasonably
sound financial condition.
B. Events of Default and Acceleration
If a Company is in violation of its covenants - and shows no
inclination to cure such violations - then the bondholders may wish
to take advantage of the remedies provided in their bonds. Most
Eurobonds issued under Fiscal Agency Agreements and Trust Agree-
ments provide that the holders of a specified principal amount of the
Eurobonds (generally varying, depending on the Eurobond issue,
from 25%-51%), acting in concert for this purpose, can give the Com-
pany a Notice of Default, specifying the covenant violation and de-
claring the entire principal amount of the bonds to be due and
payable. With Eurobonds issued under Trust Agreements, the Trustee
usually may also give the default notice to the Company.
There are important differences in the, rights of bondholders
under a Fiscal Agency Agreement, as compared to qualified Trust In-
dentures, which govern public debt issued by U.S. companies, and
Trust Agreements, which typically govern Eurobonds subject to Eng-
lish law.
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First, a Fiscal Agent, unlike a Trustee, has no fiduciary duties to
bondholders. Whereas the Trustee acts as a representative of bond-
holders, the Fiscal Agent acts as an agent of the issuer. Second, the
Fiscal Agent has a more limited role in enforcement of remedies. For
example, only a group of bondholders, and not the Fiscal Agent, can
act to accelerate the bond indebtedness. Finally, the Fiscal Agency
Agreement contains no "direct action clause" which, as a provision of
most Indentures, prohibits bondholders from taking legal action on
their own without first requesting the Indenture Trustee to act on their
behalf. Indeed, under most Eurobonds, each holder of Eurobonds
may pursue remedies individually with respect to its own Eurobonds
in the event of a payment default on the Eurobonds.
C. An "Involuntary Filing"
When a U.S. issuer of public debt is in monetary default, it is
possible for three or more of its unsecured bondholders to file an in-
voluntary Chapter 11 petition.64 If the petition is granted, it has the
effect of putting the Company, against its will, into the bankruptcy
process. This is one of the most potent weapons in the arsenal of
bondholder rights.
Mexican law takes a somewhat similar approach by permitting
one or more creditors of the Company to petition the court for a "dec-
laration of bankruptcy, leading to a quiebra or liquidation proceed-
ing."65 The court will grant the relief, thus commencing bankruptcy
proceedings, if one of several "presumptions of bankruptcy" are satis-
fied.66 In established judicial practice, one of these tests is that the
Company is in default with respect to the majority of its monetary
obligations. Under Mexican practice, the determination as to whether
such default has occurred is based on whether the majority of the
debts payable by the Company are current, irrespective of the amount
of such debts. (Note that Mexican law does not permit creditors of a
Company to file an involuntary suspension of payments, or rehabilita-
tion proceeding, against the Company.)67
The danger with this type of involuntary bankruptcy declaration
is that it places the Company into a quiebra proceeding, which leads to
total liquidation of the business. Accordingly, creditors hold a highly
64 See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
65 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 6.
66 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 2.
67 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 394, 395.
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potent weapon that can be so devastating to the Company that its use
may be counter-productive.
D. Collection Actions
If a Company defaults in the payment of its Mexican Eurobonds,
the holders of a specified amount thereof, acting through the Trustee
or the Fiscal Agent as indicated in section B above, may institute, in a
Mexican court with jurisdiction, a mercantile action against the Com-
pany, which may allow the bondholders to attach assets of the Com-
pany and take control of its cash flow at the commencement of the
action.68 To the extent the Company has no other major creditors,
such a mercantile action could help in reaching a restructuring agree-
ment. However, in cases where the Company has other major credi-
tors, the institution of a mercantile action by the bondholders may be
followed by other collection actions from other creditors, which may
lead the Company to seek suspension of payments relief.
PART 7
SUSPENSION OF PAYMENTS PROCEEDINGS
69
A. Effects of Declaration of Suspension of Payment
A Mexican debtor's willingness to negotiate with its Eurobond
holders will depend on the debtor's view of its alternatives, which in-
clude a voluntary suspension of payments proceeding (a rehabilitation
proceeding) or a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceeding (a
liquidation proceeding). A suspension of payments proceeding is
commenced by the insolvent bond issuer (the Debtor) filing a "peti-
tion" with the court in the Debtor's corporate domicile, which will
have jurisdiction over the proceeding.7 ° The petition contains basic
financial information about the Debtor and is somewhat similar to the
petition that commences a Chapter 11 case under the United States
Bankruptcy Code.
71
Numerous legal consequences flow from the court's declaration
of suspension of payments, which alters the normal legal rights of the
Debtor, its creditors and litigants. The most important of these conse-
68 For a description of judicial collection actions and the enforcement of domestic judgments,
see Agustin Berdeja-Prieto, Debt Collateralization and Business Insolvency: A Review of the
Mexican Legal System, 25 U. MiAMI INTER-Am. L. REv. 227, 240 (Winter 1993/1994).
69 For a thorough summary and analysis of suspension of payments proceedings, see id.
70 See L.Q.S.P, supra note 18, art. 395.
71 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 6 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of arti-
cle 429); 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (1988).
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quences, many of which are roughly analogous to the effects of com-
mencing a Chapter 11 reorganization under the United States
Bankruptcy Code, are summarized below:
Business Operations. Under a suspension of payments proceed-
ing, the Debtor and its management are permitted to remain in charge
of the business, much like the "debtor-in-possession" in a Chapter 11
case.72 However, the Bankruptcy Court appoints a Trustee (the
Sindico), who is authorized to closely supervise the Debtor's affairs.73
Debt and Interest Payments. Once a suspension of payments pro-
ceeding is declared, the Company is prohibited from paying any out-
standing debts (which for purposes of the suspension of payments
become due and payable), and, for practical purposes, interest on
those debts (other than secured debt, to the extent of the value of
collateral) ceases to accrue.74
Property of the Estate. The Debtor is viewed as having an "Es-
tate" composed of property in which it has legal and equitable inter-
ests.75 The assets of the Estate are what become available for the
payment of creditor claims. Parties may take legal action to separate
and reclaim certain types of assets from the Estate - including prop-
erty pledged as collateral for secured transactions.76
Litigation. All pending collection litigation being prosecuted by
or against the Debtor is transferred to the suspension of payments
proceeding and comes under the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court,
with the exception of litigation brought with respect to security inter-
ests granted by the Debtor.77 All future litigation against the Debtor,
other than litigation brought with respect to security interests granted
by the Debtor, also must be brought before that Court.
7s
Sale of Assets. Once the suspension of payments case is com-
menced, the approval of the Bankruptcy Court is required for the
Debtor's sale of assets outside the ordinary course of its business and
Court approval also is essential for other business transactions.79
72 Compare L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 410 with 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988).
73 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 415, 416.
74 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 408-13.
75 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 15, 83, 115 (applicable to suspension of payments by
virtue of art. 429).
76 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 158-62 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of
art. 429).
77 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 122-27 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of
art. 429).
78 L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 122-27.
79 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 410, 411.
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Bar Date. After the declaration of suspension of payments has
been published, the creditors have forty-five days within which they
must make filings establishing the bona fides of their respective credi-
tor claims.80
Debt Converted To Pesos. Upon commencement of a suspension
of payments proceeding, all debt denominated in foreign currency is
converted by court order to Peso-denominated debt. Accordingly,
Eurobond holders would become subject to the risk that the value of
the Peso vis-a-vis the dollar would fall after commencement of a
proceeding.81
B. Treatment of Creditor Claims
The Mexican Bankruptcy Law - like the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
- has a set of provisions that relate to the treatment of creditor
claims and cover issues ranging from the priority of Various types of
claims to the procedures for determining claims allowance:
Intervenors. Shortly after a suspension of payments proceeding is
commenced, an informational meeting of creditors is convened. At
that time the creditors may designate a panel of "Intervenors" (usu-
ally a three-member or five-member panel) who are to act as the cred-
itors' representatives in monitoring case developments.82 This panel
of Intervenors is in some respects similar to a Creditors Committee in
a U.S. Chapter 11 reorganization.8
Priority of Claims. Pursuant to Mexican Bankruptcy Law, there
are six categories of creditors - the categories being known as "de-
grees" - which are listed below in descending order of preference:
84
1st Exclusively privileged creditors, which include claims for one
year's back wages by the debtor's employees.
80 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 15 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of art.
407).
81 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 132 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of
article 429). See also Berdeja-Prieto, supra note 68, at 253 n. 198 (citing Mexican judgment in
which court interpreted Article 132 to mean that debts denominated in foreign currency are
fixed in Mexican pesos at the rate of exchange applicable on the date of the declaration of
bankruptcy).
82 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 417. See also L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 58-72 (applica-
ble to suspension of payments by virtue of art. 429).
83 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988).
84 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 261 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of art.
429).
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2nd Secured creditors, which are creditors with a lien on the assets of
the debtor. This category includes real estate mortgagees, pledg-
ees (i.e., creditors secured by personal property) and creditors
under purchase finance agreements. These creditors enjoy a prior-
ity over other creditors to the extent of the proceeds available
from the security. If a creditor is partially unsecured, however, the
unsecured component of their claim falls into the 4th category.
3rd The Government, for payment of back taxes.
4th Creditors with a special privilege, which includes a select group of
unsecured trade creditors such as building contractors and com-
mission agents.
5th Common creditors arising out of business transactions, a group
which would include the holders of unsecured Eurobond debt as
well as unsecured bank debt.
6th Common creditors based on civil law transactions, which would
include all other unsecured creditors.
All creditors within a given class must be paid in full before any
distributions are made to the next most senior class of creditors.8 5
Claims Allowance Proceedings. The suspension of payments pro-
ceeding provides for a creditors' meeting to be convened for the pur-
pose of "recognition of claims," a determination that resembles the
"allowance" of claims under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.86 The pro-
cess of recognition involves each creditor claim being scrutinized by
the Sindico and the Intervenors, with the Bankruptcy Court reaching
the final decision. If a creditor claim is not recognized, then it is not
entitled to any recovery. 7
C. The Preventative Agreement and Case Conclusion
As noted in Part 4 of this 'article, the "Preventative Agreement"
is similar to a Plan of Reorganization in a U.S. Chapter 11 case in that
it sets forth the compromise and resolution of all creditor claims and
leads to the Debtor's exit from suspension of payments proceedings.
The key provisions governing the formulation and approval of
the Preventative Agreement are summarized below.
Negotiating Process. After the proposed Preventative Agreement
is filed by the Debtor, which must occur at the beginning of the sus-
pension of payments proceeding, 8 a period of judicial struggle and
out-of-court negotiations with creditors typically follows. However, a
85 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 269 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of art.
429).
86 Compare L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 220-259 (applicable to suspension of payments by
virtue of art. 407); compare 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988).
87 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 220-259.




creditor vote on the Agreement cannot take place until the process of
creditor claim "recognition" is completed, since that determines which
claims are allowed and thus entitled to vote.89
Meeting to Approve Agreement. The Preventative Agreement is
approved at a special meeting of creditors, which is convened for that
purpose, and is administered by the bankruptcy judge. The only credi-
tors who may vote are those who attend in person. 90
Competing Proposals. Mexican Bankruptcy Law recognizes that
there can be competing proposals put before the creditors, such as one
Preventative Agreement advanced by the Debtor and another pro-
posed by a creditor group.9 In that event, both proposals will be
voted on and the one with the greatest number of votes will be
deemed accepted.92
Voting Procedures. Except in those cases where the Bankruptcy
Law requires special weighted voting, in calculating the necessary
votes in favor of or against the Preventative Agreement, each creditor
is entitled to one vote, with no special weighting of votes based on the
amount of a creditor's claim, so long as the majority of the creditors
are present at the meeting.93 Secured creditors, at their option, may
abstain from voting.94
Votes Required for Approval. If the Preventative Agreement pro-
poses to pay creditors at a discount from their face amount of their
claims, whether in immediate cash or in installments, the Bankruptcy
Law provides for a weighting mechanism designed to level creditors'
influence in the voting.95
Results of Voting. If the creditors' voting results in the approval
of a Preventative Agreement, then the Bankruptcy Judge declares the
proceedings concluded. 96 If a Preventative Agreement is not ap-
proved, then the suspension of payments proceedings are converted to
89 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 233, 234 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue
of art. 429).
90 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 296-379 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue
of art. 418).
91 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 296-303 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue
of art. 429).
92 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 315 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of art.
418).
93 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 79 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of art.
418).
94 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 308 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of art.
418).
95 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 317, 318 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue
of art. 418).
96 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 420-423, 347.
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bankruptcy (quiebra) proceedings, leading to total liquidation of the
business.
9 7
Voluntary Exit. The Debtor may waive at any time the suspen-
sion of payments protection and enter into one or more restructuring
agreements with its creditors outside the umbrella of the suspension
of payments proceeding. 98
PART 8
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS (QUIEBRA)
A. The Effects of Case Commencement
A bankruptcy proceeding, under Mexican Law, is known as
quiebra and, like a Chapter 7 proceeding under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, it generally leads to the total liquidation of the Debtor's
business.
Unlike a suspension of payments proceeding, which may only be
commenced by the Debtor voluntarily, a bankruptcy proceeding may
be commenced by the Debtor who voluntarily files a petition for a
"declaration" of bankruptcy or by a creditor who files a petition for an
involuntary "declaration" of bankruptcy.99 The effects of bankruptcy
commencement are similar to suspension of payments in that there is
(i) defined property of the "estate,"'100 (ii) a bar date for filing of cred-
itor claims and a process of claim "recognition,"'' 1 and (iii) the
designation of a panel of Intervenors to protect creditor interests.'02
Significant features of a bankruptcy proceeding include the classi-
fication of the bankruptcy as either "accidental," "culpable" or
"fraudulent," which, despite the language of the statute, is not found
in a suspension of payments proceeding in practice. 10 3 Moreover,
those in control of the Debtor can be punished with a term of impris-
onment of one to four years (for a culpable bankruptcy) and a term of
five to ten years (for a fraudulent bankruptcy). 1°4 Additional unique
features of a bankruptcy proceeding are the replacement of the Board
of Directors by the Sfndico'0 5 and the establishment of a "suspicious
97 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 419.
98 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 428.
99 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 5.
100 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 15, 83, 115.
101 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 220-259.
102 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 58-92.
103 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 91.
104 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 95, 99.
105 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 46-57.
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period" preceding the declaration of bankruptcy.10 6 Any transaction
carried out by the Company within the "suspicious period" may be
subject to special scrutiny by the Bankruptcy Court and the Sfndico,
and may be voided if deemed to constitute a fraudulent convey-
ance.' 0 7 The bankruptcy judge is given sole discretion to establish the
length of the "suspicious period,"108 unlike in the United States where
the length of similar review periods is specifically stated in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 0 9
B. The Role of the Sindico
The role of the court-appointed Sindico in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing is far more expansive than the SIndico's role in a suspension of
payments proceeding. In a bankruptcy proceeding, the Board of Di-
rectors and the existing management of the Debtor is displaced by the
Sfndico, who takes control of day-to-day operations. 110
The Sindico's mandate is to promptly marshal all assets of the
Estate and develop a plan for their liquidation. The only way to avoid
total liquidation is for the creditors to show that it would not be in
their best interests."'
C. Plan of Liquidation
The distribution of liquidation proceeds does not take place until
after the bankruptcy court has conducted the special meeting of credi-
tors at which creditor claims are "recognized. 11 2 No later than four
months after that meeting, the Sfndico must presumably begin interim
distributions of liquidation proceeds, and continue this process once
every four months until all proceeds have been distributed to credi-
tors." 3 The distributions are made in accordance with the priority of
creditor claims previously discussed in Part 7.
As the process of distributions nears completion, the Court con-
venes a final meeting of creditors at which the SIndico issues its final
report, accounting for all liquidation distributions." 4 Thereafter, the
bankruptcy proceeding is concluded.
106 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 118, 121.
107 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 168-174.
108 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 116-121.
109 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1988).
110 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 46.
111 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 201.
112 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 220.
113 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 274-278.
114 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 274-278.
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PART 9
CONCLUSION
Many Mexican companies face substantial Eurobond maturities
in 1996 and 1997, in addition to the burdensome maturities that came
due in 1995 after the Peso's devaluation. Unless the financial markets
for new Mexican Eurobond debt strengthens considerably in 1996, a
number of Mexican companies may face difficulties in refinancing
their Eurobond debt and may be forced to consider consensual, out-
of-court restructurings with their Eurobond holders or consider much
less attractive options such as suspension of payments or bankruptcy
proceedings in Mexico.
In these restructuring negotiations, holders of Mexican
Eurobonds - who are new as a major creditor constituency in Mexi-
can restructurings - may draw on their experiences in U.S. high
yield, or "junk bond," restructurings of the early 1990s. Mexican com-
panies' "bondholder constituency" may seek to form bondholder com-
mittees to lead negotiations with the companies, much like "advisory
committees" of commercial banks which typically represented credi-
tors in the Mexican restructurings of the 1980s. Mexican debtors and
their bondholders are likely to consider restructuring alternatives
ranging from the relatively minor - temporary covenant relief, par-
tial repayments and/or the posting of collateral - to a comprehensive
revamping of the debtors' capital structure - involving debt-for-debt
exchanges, debt-for-equity exchanges and new equity holders.
Eurobond holders' leverage in restructuring negotiations will be
determined largely by their legal rights under the agreements pursu-
ant to which the Eurobonds were issued, which will vary depending on
the Eurobonds' covenant package, events of default, acceleration pro-
visions and the ability of bondholders to initiate collection suits
against a defaulting Eurobond issuer. Mexican debtors and bondhold-
ers are likely to view restructuring as preferable to a suspension of
payments proceeding, which is long, expensive and uncertain. Almost
all parties to a restructuring will wish to avoid a Mexican bankruptcy
(quiebra) proceeding, which will be all but certain to result in the
debtor's liquidation.
ANNEX I
SELECTIVE COMPARISON OF U.S. AND MEXICAN
BANKRUPTCY LAWS
Those familiar with the U.S. Bankruptcy Code may have noticed
from the summaries of suspension of payments and bankruptcy pro-
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ceedings in Parts 7 and 8 of this article that they did not include sev-
eral key features of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's Chapter 11
reorganization process. Some of those significant features are noted
below:
A. Exclusivity
In a suspension of payments proceeding, only the debtor has the
ability, initially, to propose a Preventative Agreement, which is
roughly analogous to a Chapter 11 Restructuring Plan.115 The Pre-
ventative Agreement, however, must be proposed and filed on the
first day of suspension of payments proceedings." 6 Typically this is
followed by several months of negotiations with creditors over what
they consider to be acceptable terms for the Agreement. Thus, credi-
tors can attempt to influence the restructuring process almost
immediately.
Under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor's ex-
clusive right to file a Plan lasts for the first 120 days of the reorganiza-
tion proceeding." 7 This "exclusivity" often is extended. This can lead
to extreme frustration among creditors who may have developed their
own version of a Plan but cannot propose it, or bring it to a vote, so
long as the Debtor's exclusive period remains in force.
B. Class Voting
While the general rule is that each creditor is entitled to one vote
in the voting of the Preventative Agreement, the Bankruptcy Law re-
quires qualified majorities of creditors and amounts of claims to ap-
prove certain Preventative Agreements where excessive debt
forgiveness and/or repayment time is sought." 8
In a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, the various types of cred-
itors - secured, subordinated and unsecured - must be divided into
separate "classes" and must vote on the Plan by class.119
For a class to be deemed to have accepted the Plan, it requires
the votes of two-thirds in dollar amount and a majority in number of
those voting within a given class.120 At least one "impaired" class (L e.,
a group of creditors receiving less than a full recovery) must vote to
115 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 398.
116 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 398-492.
117 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1988).
118 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 317-323.
119 See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988).
120 See id. § 1126.
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accept the Plan,121 and creditors who receive a full recovery do not
vote and instead are deemed to have accepted the Plan. 22
Because of the two-thirds dollar amount requirement for class ac-
ceptance of a Plan, a group of dissident creditors - who hold, for
example, 35% of the claims in their class - are viewed as having a
"blocking position." Simply put, -f all these creditors voted against
the Plan, class acceptance could not possibly be obtained.
Creditors with the larger dollar amount of the claims also have
greater influence in the voting. This is because acceptance of the Plan
by a class requires a vote of two-thirds in dollar amount, as well as a
majority in number, of the creditor claims voting within a given
class.123
C. Cram Down
If a Preventative Agreement receives a majority vote of the credi-
tors in a suspension of payments proceeding, then the Agreement, and
the creditor recoveries it offers, apply to all creditors. 24 Creditors
who voted against the Agreement - even if they are a large minority
block - are forced to accept the recoveries provided for in the
Agreement.
Chapter 11 takes a somewhat different approach, providing that a
Plan can be approved even if all creditors, in a given class, vote against
it.' 25 However, in order for the Plan to be "crammed down" on these
dissident creditors, it must be shown that (i) no one junior to the dissi-
dent creditors is receiving any consideration, 26 and (ii) the dissident
creditors would fare no worse in a liquidation of the Debtor.
127
D. Equitable Subordination
Under Chapter 11, the claims of a given creditor or creditor
group can be "subordinated" by the Bankruptcy Court to a more jun-
ior ranking, thus diminishing their creditor recovery under the Plan."2
Under Mexican Bankruptcy Law, there is no analogue to equitable
subordination.
121 See id. § 1129(a)(10).
122 See id. § 1126(0.
123 See id. § 1126(c).
124 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 316 (applicable to suspension of payments by virtue of art.
418).
125 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988).
126 See id. § 1129(b).
127 See id. § 1129(a)(7).
128 See id. § 510.
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E. Disclosure and Plan Confirmation
Under Mexican suspension of payments proceedings, the entire
process of approval of the Preventative Agreement is far less compli-
cated than the analogous Chapter 11 process of Plan confirmation.
First, Mexican law completely eliminates the need for a Disclo-
sure Statement, which is a lengthy document, similar to a prospectus,
which must accompany a Plan of Reorganization and requires Bank-
ruptcy Court approval before it can be distributed. 29
Second, if a Chapter 11 Plan obtains the requisite creditor accept-
ances, it still must be the subject of an elaborate confirmation hearing
and will not be approved by the Bankruptcy Court unless numerous
conditions to confirmation are satisfied.' 30 In contrast, if a Prevent-
ative Agreement is approved by a vote of the creditors, it is accepted
by the Court as long as certain minimal requirements are met.
Among other things, the amount offered to creditors must not be be-
low the repayment capacity of the debtor, and the enforcement of the
agreement must be sufficiently guaranteed.' 31 There is, however, a
mechanism by which the Court's approval or disapproval of the
Agreement may be appealed.' 3
2
129 See id. § 1125.
130 See id. § 1129.
131 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, art. 420.
132 See L.Q.S.P., supra note 18, arts. 422, 343-346.
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ANNEX II
SELECTIVE LIST OF MATURING EUROBONDS OF
MEXICAN PRIVATE SECTOR ISSUERS*
Issuer
1995 Maturities
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* Source: BDS Securities; Latin Finance
